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This paper provides an algorithm to produce a time series estimate of the political center 
(or median voter) from aggregate survey data, even when the same questions are not 
asked in most years. This is compared to the existing Stimson dyad ratios approach, 
which has been applied to various questions in political science. Unlike the dyad ratios 
approach, the model developed here is derived from an explicit model of individual 
behavior ± the widely used item response theory model. I compare the results of both 
techniques using the data on public opinion from the United Kingdom from 1947-2005 
from Bartle, Dellepiane-Avellaneda and Stimson (2011a). Measures of overall model fit 
DUH SURYLGHG DV ZHOO DV WHFKQLTXHV IRU WHVWLQJ PRGHO¶V DVVXPSWLRQV DQG WKH ILW RI






There are many contexts where we wish to estimate the aggregate level of public 
opinion ± the position of the political center, the location of the median voter, the 
prevailing policy mood, or the overall level of support for a particular policy. Often we 
do not have individual level panel data for the entire time period we are interested in. 
This is not an insurmountable problem as we are interested in aggregate, rather than 
individual, level change. Indeed, in order to increase the coverage of the time period, we 
may use questions for which we only have aggregate response data. However, we face 
another problem. Even if we have many question items administered in each year, it is 
often the case that no item is administered in more than a small proportion of the years. 
However, if the questions that are asked in different years overlap sufficiently, it is still 
possible to generate a comparable time series measure for the level of public opinion for 
all years. This paper proposes a model for doing this based on item response theory, and 
evaluates it against the existing approaches such as the Stimson dyad ratios algorithm.
1
 
The Stimson dyad ratios algorithm has now been used to address this kind of 
problem in a considerable number of contexts. It was devHORSHG LQ6WLPVRQ¶VZRUNRQ
American public opinion (Stimson 1991, 1999). It is an important part of the Erikson, 
0F.XHQ DQG 6WLPVRQ¶V Macropolity project (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; 
Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995). More recently the approach has been extended to 
                                                 
1
 I would like to thank Professor William Batchelder for introducing me to item response 
theory. I would also like to thank Professor Simon Jackman. I would like to thank Dr. 
John Bartle, Professor James Stimson and Dr. Sebastian Dellepiane-Avellaneda, whose 
work inspired this project, and who were kind enough to share their data with me. 
 2 
the United Kingdom (Bartle, Dellepiane-Avellaneda, and Stimson 2011a; Bartle, 
Dellepiane-Avellaneda, and Stimson 2011b) and France (Stimson, Thiébaut, and Tiberj 
2009). There have also been a number of unrelated studies that use the dyad ratios 
algorithm (Cohen 2000; Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000; Kellstadt 2003; Voeten and 
Brewer 2006; Baumgartner, De Boef, and Boydstun 2008).  
This ability to measure change in public opinion over long time period provides 
the opportunity to address many additional outstanding problems. This includes not just 
issues of political behavior, but also political economy and comparative political 
institutions. For example, to operationalize some rational choice theories, it is necessary 
to have a measure of the position of the median voter. When studying phenomena such as 
the growth and retrenchment of the welfare state, it would be hugely helpful to have an 
independent measure of public demand for such programs. There are various studies that 
attempt to measure the responsiveness to public opinion of various electoral systems or 
constitutional arrangements (Powell 2000; McDonald and Budge 2005). The problem 
they face is that they are forced to use extremely indirect measures of public opinion ± 
left-right self-placement from survey data in Powell; the declared position of the median 
party in parliament in MacDonald and Budge (see also Kim and Fording 2001). The 
methods discussed here provide a way to estimate this directly using existing data. 
The Stimson dyad ratios algorithm is an ingenious approach to these problems 
that was computationally tractable given the computer resources available in the 1990s. 
However, it is theoretically ad hoc ± there is no individual level model linking individual 
level response behavior to the aggregate outcomes we observe. For this reason, it is 
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uncertain exactly what is being measured. Given that computer resources are now far less 
of a constraint, other approaches are now possible. 
As an alternative, I propose an approach that explicitly estimates the central 
tendency of the distribution of public opinion based on an individual level model of 
behavior. This adapts an established item response theory model from psychometrics ± a 
model that has also been widely applied to individual level data in political science in 
recent years. This approach has the added advantage of estimating not only the central 
tendency, but also the variance of the distribution. I provide code for implementing the 
model using freely available software (BUGS and JAGS). I also compare the results of 
the item response theory approach with those using the dyad ratios algorithm and other 
approaches, using the data on British domestic public opinion from Bartle, Dellepiane-
Avellaneda and Stimson (2011a).
2
 In addition to comparing overall measures of model 
fit, I provide tools for testing the assumptions of the models and evaluating item 
selection. 
2. The Dyad ratios Algorithm and existing IRT approaches 
We cam compare the model proposed in this paper to the existing models for 
estimating policy mood from aggregate data (Stimson 1991; Voeten and Brewer 2006; 
Jackman 2005), and also to existing IRT approaches. The existing policy mood models 
lack an individual level model of response, but instead simply assume the existence of 
aggregate policy mood. Item response theory provides such an individual level model. 
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There have been many applications of item response theory to political attitudes and 
ideology. These existing IRT models, however, use individual level data. The approach 
pursued in this paper is essentially to extend these models to the case where we only have 
aggregate data. 
The Stimson dyad ratios algorithm was the first attempt (to my knowledge) to 
estimate the central tendency of the policy mood for each year from aggregate data.
3
 The 
key assumption of the algorithm is that the ratio of left responses between two years in 
which a given question is asked represents an estimate of the relative policy mood of 
these two years. It is then possible to piece together the various estimates of the relative 
magnitudes of policy mood to produce a series of estimates. Thus, each administered 
survey question is recoded so that answers are classified as either left-wing or not left-
wing, and the proportion of left-wing responses (left / (left + not left) is recorded for each 
question. If a question is asked in years t+i and t+j, then Rij is the ratio of the proportion 
of left-wing responses to the question administered in year t+i to the proportion of left-
wing responses in year t+j. Thus the key assumption of the model (Bartle, Dellepiane-
Avellaneda, and Stimson 2011a, 268) is: 
  (1) 
where xt+i and xt+j are positions of the political center in years t+i and t+j. As is made 
clear in the text, what this means is that Rij (for which we have observable data) can be 
                                                 
3
 In laying out this algorithm, I use the terminology from Bartle, Dellepiane-Avellaneda 
and Stimson (2011a), as this is most recent exposition and the notation is most elegant. 
However, the fullest explication of the algorithm is in Stimson (1999, 133-7). 
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used as an estimate of the relative magnitude of xt+i and xt+j. If we have assumed or 
imputed a value for xt+j, we can use Rij to estimate xt+i. Of course there are usually 
multiple items that are asked in any pair of years, so there are also multiple estimates of 
the policy mood in any year. The algorithm essentially averages together these estimates 
of policy mood. It then uses these estimates to calculate the communality of each 
question ± how well it predicts policy mood. The policy mood estimates are then 
recalculated weighted by these communalities. This process is repeated iteratively until 
the policy mood and communality estimates converge. 
As the Stimson dyad ratios algorithm lacks an explicit individual level model of 
response, it is not clear exactly what it is measuring. However, the central assumption of 
the model ± that the ratio of the percentage of left responses to the same question asked in 
different years provides a measure of the relative policy mood of the two years ± has 
some worrying implication that cast doubt on its accuracy as a measure of policy mood. 
A change from 10% answering a question in a left-wing manner to 20% represents the 
same dyad ratio as a change from 20% to 40%, or from 40% to 80%, and thus by the 
assumption of the algorithm represents the same change in policy mood. Apart from 
seeming arbitrary, this produces a startling asymmetry between left and right. A 
movement from 20% to 40% gives a ratio of 1:2, but a movement from 80% to 60% only 
gives a ratio of 4:3. However, if we counted the probability of right-wing answers instead 
of left-wing, these ratios would be reversed. This suggests that we may get different 
results if we calculate from the percentage of right-wing answers, even though this is 
providing essentially the same information. This phenomenon is especially problematic 
when we consider questions that are extremely hard or extremely easy to answer in a left-
 6 
wing manner.  If 90% of the population answers a question in a left-wing manner in years 
when the political center is around its long-run median, it is not possible for this question 
to reflect a sharp move to the left. Even if we have 100% give the left-wing answer, we 
only get a ratio of 10:9.
4
 
Another, more recent, approach to this problem is that of Voeten and Brewer 
(2006). This uses Bayesian estimation of a linear function to estimate policy mood from 
aggregate data. The policy mood variable they consider is support for the US war in Iraq, 
and the data is the percentage of respondents answering in a pro-war manner to various 
questions. Questions are asked repeatedly, but no question is asked in every period. Thus 
the model is: 
  (2) 
where Yjt is the percentage answering yes to question j in period t, aj is the bias of the 
question i, bj is the loading of question i and Tt is the policy mood in period t. The policy 
mood Tt is assumed to be subject to a random walk adjustment process. This model is 
closely related to the model that Jackman (2005) proposes to pool opinion polls from 
different survey houses ± they are both linear models of aggregate public opinion with 
dynamic adjustment processes. 
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 7KLVSUREOHPPD\EHPLWLJDWHGVRPHZKDWE\WKHIDFWWKDW6WLPVRQ¶VDOJRULWKP
iteratively reweights items based on communalities. If extremely easy or hard items 
exhibit the odd response behavior we predict, we would expect them to correlate poorly 
with the estimate of policy mood, and be assigned a low weight. Essentially there would 
be item selection in favor of items with average difficulty. The cost of this is that the 
information contained in very easy or difficult questions is not used. 
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As with the Stimson algorithm, these models provide no individual level model of 
response ± it is simply assumed that the aggregate responses react to changes in policy 
mood in a linear manner. These linear models do not produce the asymmetry in response 
between left and right that we see with the dyad ratios algorithm. In fact, a given change 
in policy mood is assumed to produce the same change in the percentage of left answers, 
regardless of how many people were giving left answers to start with. This assumption is 
itself problematic. If we have a policy mood that is already quite left-wing, we would 
expect even a large movement to the left to have very little effect (virtually everyone is 
answering left-wing already). If, however, the policy mood is quite centrist, we would 
expect a change in policy mood to have a much greater effect. 
Item response theory models allow us to model response in a more plausible way, 
so that a given move in policy mood can have a different effect depending on how likely 
a left response was anyway. It usually does thin by using a logistic or cumulative normal 
link function, in a manner similar to logistic or probit regression.  
Item response theory models have long been used in psychology, but have also 
recently been applied to many problems in political science. They have been applied to 
ideal point estimation in legislatures using roll call data (Jackman 2001; Clinton, 
Jackman, and Rivers 2004). Indeed Jackman (2000) points out that the Poole and 
Rosenthal (1997) NOMINATE algorithm is closely related to the item response model. 
Other scholars have used item response models to estimate the ideal points of Supreme 
Court justices (Martin and Quinn 2002; Bafumi et al. 2005; Peress 2009). There have also 
 8 
been some applications of item response theory to mass opinion using individual level 
survey data (Jessee 2009; Bafumi and Herron 2010; Levendusky and Pope 2010).
5
 
The model set out in this paper differs from these applications in two ways. 
Firstly, although the model is built from an individual level model of survey response, the 
data is at the aggregate level. As with the Stimson dyad ratios and the Voeten and Brewer 
approaches, we do not have data on individual responses, but only the percentage of 
respondents who responded each way to a question. Secondly we do have questions that 
are repeated at different points over time. This is not typically the case when estimating 
the ideal points of legislators or Justices ± bills and court cases only happen once. Most 
existing item response models either estimate ideal points for a single legislature or 
Court, assume that legislators or Justices retain fixed positions over their careers, or use a 
dynamic updating model (for example, Martin and Quinn 2002), whereby it is assumed 
that ideal points change gradually over time. 
3. An item response theory model of policy mood 
I adapt the item response theory model to measure policy mood using aggregate 
survey response data. While existing methods, like the dyad ratios approach, may track 
the political center, we have no theoretical basis for the claim that we are measuring the 
central tendency of the distribution of public opinion. With an IRT approach we can 
explicitly model the central tendency and dispersion of public opinion and draw 
inferences from it.  
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 These articles all use the Cooperative Congressional Election Study, which asks 
respondents questions referring to specific Congressional Bills, thus allowing voters and 
legislators to be placed in the same space. 
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The standard item response theory model uses responses to test questions to 
simultaneously estimate the ability of the respondents and the characteristics of the 
questions (Nunnally and Bernstein 1994, 393-409). We assume that each individual has 
an ability level that is unidimensional, with xi representing the ability level of individual 
i. Each question q can have various parameters, but we assume it has two, difficulty and 
discrimination, represented as Oq and Dq. The most commonly used functional forms are 
the lognormal and (as here) the normal cumulative distribution function: 
  (3) 
This is, of course, closely related to probit regression, which is commonplace in political 
science. Figure 1 graphs this response function for three questions with different values 
of O and D. 
 
Figure 1 ± Probability of correct response to three questions 
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If the position of the respondent xi is equal to Oq, then the probability of giving the 
correct response is .5. If xi is greater (less) than Oq, then the probability of a correct 
response is greater (less than) 0.5. Thus question 1, with its low value of O, is easy to 
answer correctly (a very low level of ability is required to have a high probability 
answering incorrectly), while question 3 has a high value of O and is very difficult to 
answer correctly. How quickly the probability of a correct response increases or 
GHFUHDVHV DV WKH UHVSRQGHQW¶V DELOLW\ FKDQJHV GHSHQGV RQ WKH GLVFULPLQDWLRQ SDUDPHWHU
Dq. Question 1 has a low value of D, so if the respondent has ability much greater than O1, 
the probability of a correct response rapidly approaches 1. However question 3 has a high 
D VR DV WKH UHVSRQGHQW¶V DELOLW\ PRYHV ORZHU WKDQ O3, the probability of a correct 
response only falls slowly. 
Looking at Figure 1, we can see why the IRT model provides a more plausible 
model of response than the models implied by the Stimson dyad ratios approach or the 
Voeten and Brewer (2006) linear model. In contrast to what is implied by the dyad ratios 
algorithm, the response function is symmetric, so we get equivalent results whether we 
use left or right-wing responses. Unlike the Voeten and Brewer model, the response is not 
linear, so a given change in ability (or preference) can make more difference when a 
UHVSRQGHQW¶V DELOLW\ JLYHV WKHP D ILIW\-fifty chance answering a question correctly (or 
left-wing) than for a respondent who is almost certain to answer the question correctly 
anyway. 
If we had individual level data, this model could be adapted to our problem in a 
straightforward way. The probability of answering in a left-wing manner would simply 
 11 
UHSODFH WKH SUREDELOLW\ RI DQVZHULQJ FRUUHFWO\ DQG ³DELOLW\´ ZRXOG EH UHLQWHUSUHWHG DV 
SURSHQVLW\ WRDQVZHU LQD OHIWZLQJPDQQHURUVLPSO\DVKRZ³OHIW-ZLQJ´D UHVSRQGHQW
was (with higher scores for more left-wing respondents). The difficulty and 
discrimination parameters of the questions would work exactly as before. The only 
change required would be that the same respondent would be allowed to have a different 
policy position for each year they participated. 
We, of course, do not have sufficient individual panel data with which to estimate 
this model, but instead have to rely on aggregate data. Therefore we cannot estimate the 
position of each individual, but only the average position of the population in any given 
year. This, however, is exactly what we are interested in ± the central tendency of the 
distribution of public opinion. Indeed, if we assume that the population is normally 
distributed, not only can we estimate the population mean, but also the standard 
deviation, which gives us a measure of how polarized public opinion is. 
Let us lay out the model formally. Let us denote the year by y with the range 
VWDUW\HDU«HQG\HDU/HWXVGHQRWH WKHQXPEHURI WKHTXHVWLRQRU LWHPEHLQJDVNHGDVT
ZKLFK UDQJHV IURP«4 (DFKTXHVWLRQZLOOEHDVNHG LQ DW OHDVW WZRGLIIHUHQW \HDUV
:HKDYHGDWDRQ WKHSURSRUWLRQRI UHVSRQGHQWVZKRJDYHD³OHIt-ZLQJ´DQVZHU WRHDFK
question that was asked. This we denote as leftry q, the proportion that gave a left wing 
answer to question q in year y. For each year, we estimate the mean policy position of 
population, which we will call Py. This is simply a real number with the convention that 
low scores stand for more right-wing positions and high scores for more left-wing 
positions. We will also estimate the standard deviation of the distribution of the 
UHVSRQGHQWV¶SRVLWLRQVLQHDFK\Har, Vy. In addition we need to estimate parameters that 
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characterize each question. As before, the parameter Oq VWDQGV IRU WKH ³SRVLWLRQ´ RI
question q, with high scores for question that are hard to answer in a left-wing manner, 
while parameter Dq represents how effectively the question discriminates between left 
and right-wing respondents. 
Although we only have aggregate data, we need to start with a model of 
individual choice on responses. We use the same cumulative normal model as above, 
with mean Oq and standard deviation Dq. If ei y q is the probability of respondent i in year y 
giving a left wing response to question q, and xi y is the policy position of respondent i in 
year y, and )is the cumulative normal distribution function, then: 
  (4) 
We assume that the respondents in year y are normally distributed with mean Py 
and standard deviation Vy. Essentially we are assuming that all respondents in a given 
year are drawn from the same distribution of policy positions, and that each question 
behaves on average in the same way, whatever year it is asked in. The response function 
ey q (Equation 5) gives us the probability of a respondent with position x giving the left-
wing response. We assume that the probability of a respondent having policy position x 
in year y is given by the normal probability density function with mean Py and standard 
deviation Vy. Given this, the probability of a randomly selected agent giving the left 
response to question q in year y (which we will call my q) is the product of ey q and the 
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normal density function integrated over all possible values of x. Thus if I is the normal 
probability density function: 
  (5) 
Integrating, we get: 
  (6) 
We may note the symmetry in the effect of the parameters Dq and Vy. The 
standard deviation of the normal distribution function that gives the probability of a left 
response is the geometric mean of the two parameters. Intuitively we would expect the 
two parameters to have a similar effect. A question that does not discriminate well leads 
to a significant number of right wing responses, even given a left-wing population. A 
population with a high variance will also lead to a significant number of right-wing 
responses, even if the mean of the population is quite left-wing. 
Given the function my q for the expected probability of a random respondent 
giving a left-wing answer, we can model the total number of left-wing responses to a 
question using the beta-binomial distribution. The reason for using the beta-binomial is to 
allow some stochastic variation to account for the fact that the same question may be 
applied or understood in slightly different ways in different years. Thus the final 
probability of a left-wing response to question q in year y is distributed according to the 
beta distribution with expectation my q. Given that the expectation of the beta distribution 
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with parametersD and E is DDEwe can reparameterize the beta distribution in terms 
of its expectation. Thus the probability of a random respondent giving a left-wing 
response, which we call py q, is distributed thus: 
  (8) 
The number of left-wing responses expected for question q in year y, where ny q is 
the number of responses to that question, is then distributed binomially: 
  (9)
 
Assigning non-informative uniform priors to the parameter vectors EVO and 
Das well as to the beta parameter E, we can estimate the model using Bayesian inference 
software such as BUGS or JAGS. Figure 2 gives a graphical summary of the model. 
Appendix 1 gives complete code for JAGS and BUGS. 
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Figure 2 ± Graph of the model 
4. Results and Model Fit 
The IRT algorithm was applied to data from Bartle, Dellepiane-Avellaneda and 
Stimson (2011a). The authors collected a database of the aggregate results of survey 
questions about political matters in the UK between 1947 and 2005. The results were 
UHFRGHG WR JLYH WKH SURSRUWLRQ RI UHVSRQGHQWV JLYLQJ WKH ³OHIW-ZLQJ´ DQVZHU WR HDFK
question. Following the authors, I have only used the question dealing with domestic 
policy issues. There were 364 different question items (two of which were dropped for 
reasons for reasons of differential item functioning
7
). Each of these was asked in at least 
                                                 
7
 Testing for differential item functioning ± the violation of the assumption that items 
behave the same way whatever year they are asked in ± is dealt with in section 5. 
However, cursory analysis of the data revealed that two items (dealing with spending on 
education and the National Health Service) strongly violated this assumption. 
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two different years, resulting in a total of 2377 question administrations.
8
 Each line of the 
input dataset corresponds to one question administration, with variables for the 
proportion of left responses (left / (left + not left), the year the question was asked, the 
number of the question item, and the number of respondents.  
The model was estimated using JAGS. I used 3 chains, each with 30,000 
iterations, and a 15,000 iteration burn-in. Convergence was checked for by inspecting the 
traceplots and by calculated Geweke and Raftery / Lewis diagnostics. These diagnostics 
are provided in the web/reviewer appendix. The full CODA file is available on request. 
The model estimates policy position and standard deviation parameters for each of the 59 
years from 1947 to 2005, position and discrimination parameters for each of the 362 
questions and one coefficient for the beta distribution, which captures the degree of 
stochastic variation between question administrations. Given we are more interested in 
the policy positions of the population than the characteristics of the individual questions, 
the parameters relating to the question items (Oq and Dq) are given in the web/reviewer 
appendix, while the parameters for the policy position of the population (Py and Vy) are 
given in the main appendix and graphed in Figures 3 and 4 
Figure 3 graphs the estimate of policy mood by year from the IRT method 
outlined in the last section, and compares this to the results from Bartle, Dellepiane-
Avellaneda and Stimson (2011a, 271) computed using the Stimson dyad ratios method. 
The IRT results represent the probability of a respondent answering in a left-wing manner 
to a typical question in a given year (Oq = -.357, Vy = 6.16). The Stimson dyad ratios 
                                                 
8
 The average question was asked in between six and seven different years. The two most 
often asked questions were asked in 40 and 20 out of the 59 years. 
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method does not directly allow the estimation of response to individual items, but the raw 
SROLF\ PRRG VFRUHV KDYH EHHQ VWDQGDUGL]HG XVLQJ WKH ³YDOLGLW\-weighted means and 
standard deviations of the input itePV´ (Bartle, Dellepiane-Avellaneda, and Stimson 
2011a, 269). 
 
Figure 3 -- Estimated policy mood ± IRT method and dyad ratios results from Bartle, 
Dellepiane-Avellaneda and Stimson (2011). 
It is apparent that the results from the two methods are quite similar. The 
correlation coefficient between the Bartle, Dellepiane-Avellaneda and Stimson dyad 
ratios and the IRT estimates from 1950 to 2005 is 0.71. However, this coefficient is 
depressed by the period 1947-62 for which there is very little data. From 1963 to 2005 
the correlation is .91, and for the years 1970-2005 it is .93. We can observe the same 
patterns in both series of estimates. In general public opinion moves against whoever is in 
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office. The British electorate leans to the left in the early postwar period, but through the 
fifties and sixties it seems to gradually move towards the center (although data is sparse 
until the mid-1960s, so we have limited confidence in our measurements). There is 
instability in the early seventies, followed by a sharp move to the right following the re-
election of a Labour government under Harold Wilson in 1974. However, the electorate 
moves steadily leftward under the Conservative governments of Thatcher (1979-90) and 
Major (1990-7). The victory of Tony Blair and the Labour Party in the 1997 general 
election leads to a gradual movement back towards the right, although this is temporarily 
halted in the election years of 2001 and 2005. 
There are, however, some substantively interesting differences. According the 
Bartle, Dellepiane-Avellaneda and Stimson (2011a) estimates, policy mood in the UK 
moves to the right until the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979. However, the IRT 
estimates indicate that policy mood reached its rightmost point in 1976, the year when the 
Sterling crisis forced the UK to seek IMF loans, and subsequently moved somewhat back 
to the left under the Callaghan administration (1976-79). The movement of policy mood 
to the right under Blair (1997-2005) is rather less pronounced according to the IRT 
estimates than with the dyad ratios estimates. While the dyad ratios estimates are 
smoothed as part of the algorithm, the IRT results are not. This allows us to observe some 
interesting patterns on a year by year basis. For example, in the election years of 2001 
and 2005, the rightward movement of policy mood under Blair was temporarily reversed. 
In 1992, we observe a similar effect ± the leftward movement of public opinion is 
temporarily halted, and John Major won the general election. 
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The IRT algorithm allows us to estimate not just the central tendency of the 
SRSXODWLRQ¶VSROLF\PRRd, but also the dispersion of the population. Figure 4 illustrates 
this. The black line charts the probability of a randomly selected respondent giving a left 
wing answer to a typical question in a given year. The grey lines chart that probability of 
a person drawn from the population to the left or right of the median giving a left wing 





Figure 4 ± Predicted percentage giving left response to a typical question for whole 
population and left-wing and right-wing halves of population 
We can see that the polarization of the population varies considerably across time. 
During the 1970s there is considerable polarization. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
this polarization decreases as the left and right wing parts of the population converge. 
After this polarization increases again. These changes in the dispersion or polarization are 
interesting in themselves. Estimating the dispersion of the population also allows us to 
get better estimates of its central tendency. It is notable that the period where the IRT 
estimates of policy mood diverge most from the dyad ratios estimate are when there is a 
big change in polarization, for example in the mid-1970s. This can be explained by the 
 21 
fact that the dyad ratios algorithm will interpret an increase or reduction in polarization as 
a change in the central tendency of policy mood.
9
 
Model Fit and Alternative Models 
I have argued that the IRT model outlined here provides a more plausible model 
of response behavior than the previously existing models. We can compare the IRT 
model with other methods in terms of how well it fits the data.  In this context model fit 
means how well we can reconstruct the original data from the model parameters we have 
estimated. That is to say, given our estimates of policy mood and the parameters 
describing the behavior of each survey item, how well can we predict the response to 
each item administration? 
A simple measure of fit is the root mean square residual. This is defined as: 
(11) 
where leftpa is the percentage giving a left wing answer to question a, a is the index of the 
question administrations 1...A, and the hat sign means predicted value. Intuitively, this is 
how many percentage points we are off on average in estimating the aggregate response 
to a question. 
Of course, it is possible that we could predict responses quite accurately, but that 
this is simply a result of the fact that some questions always draw few left-wing answers 
                                                 
9
 If the central tendency is to the right and dispersion decreases, then fewer respondents 
will give left wing answers to questions that are hard to answer in a left wing manner. 
This will be interpreted by the dyad ratios algorithm as shift to the right in policy mood.  
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while other questions are uniformly easy to answer in a left-wing manner, so that we can 
explain most of the variance with just the item means. To account for this possibility, we 
can calculate a by item R
2
 measure. This is identical to a normal R
2
, except that instead of 
calculating the denominator using the mean of all question administrations, we use the 




Roughly speaking, this measures the proportion of the variance that the model explains, 
over an above what is explained by the item means. 
The models that we are comparing have differing numbers of parameters. For this 
reason I calculate an adjusted by item R
2
 measure. This is defined: 
  (13) 
where dfm is the number of degrees of freedom of the predictive model, while dfn is the 
number of degrees of freedom of the estimate of the variance. Given that the mean is a 
vector of means for each item, dfn is the number of question administrations minus the 
number of items. 
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We can compare the fit of the IRT model to various other models. Firstly, there is 
the linear model of the type used by Voeten and Brewer (2006) (see Equation 2). 
Secondly there is a simple probit model. This is specified as: 
  (14) 
where xy is policy mood, Oq is the difficulty parameter, Dq is the discrimination parameter 
and my q is the expected proportion of left-wing responses. This is then input into the 
same beta-binomial distribution as with the IRT model to estimate response. Finally there 
is the Stimson dyad ratios algorithm. This model does not directly predict the responses 
to individual items. However, we can take the estimates of policy mood from Bartle, 
Dellepiane-Avellaneda and Stimson (2011a) and use either linear or probit regression to 
estimate the responses to the different items that were asked, giving each item a difficulty 
and a discrimination parameter. 
Table 1 compares the fit of the various models ± that is to say, how well he can 
recreate the original responses from our estimates of policy mood and question difficulty. 
First we consider the root mean squared residuals. Roughly speaking this is the average 
error we get when we estimate the responses to all the questions from our parameters. 
With all our models this is between 5 and 6 percentage points. By way of comparison 
using just the mean response levels of the various questions items, we get a residual of 
7.24 percentage points. The residual for the IRT model is 5.38%, which is somewhat 
lower than the other models. 
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IRT model
 
5.35 0.481 0.319 
Linear model 5.68 0.416 0.290 
Probit model 5.58 0.435 0.313 
Dyad ratios / linear 
predictions 
5.78 0.397 0.238 
Dyad ratios / probit 
predictions 
5.96 0.359 0.191 
Item means only 7.24 0 (by construction) 0 (by construction) 
Table 1 ± Fit of the IRT model and various other models 
When we consider the by item R
2
, once again the IRT model does somewhat 
better than the other models. The IRT model has a by item R
2
 of 0.48, which roughly 
means that it explains about half the variance in responses over and above what is 
explained by the item means. As with the root means squared residuals, the probit model 
does slightly worse than the IRT model (by item R
2
 = 0.435), followed by the linear 
model (0.416). The dyad ratios model does worst (R
2
 = 0.397 or 0.359 depending on 
whether we use linear or probit predictions). When we consider the by item R
2
 adjusted 
by the number of parameters, the IRT model once again does best, but its adjusted R
2
 is 
almost identical to that of the simple probit model. That is to say, the additional variance 
explained just about justifies the extra parameters used. 
Thus the IRT model fits this data somewhat better than the probit and linear 
models, and considerably better than the dyad ratios scores. The improvement in fit over 
the simple probit model is marginal ± the closer fit barely justifies the additional 
parameters. This is not surprising as the IRT model and the probit model are 
mathematically extremely similar. However, the IRT model has the added advantages of 
being better justified in terms of individual-level behavior and the additional parameters 
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(the polarization of the population in terms of policy mood) are substantively interesting. 
Nevertheless, the estimates of all the models are quite similar. As stated above, even the 
dyad ratios scores correlate very well with the estimates of the IRT model. The fact that 
different estimation methods produce very similar results provide some reassurance about 
the validity of the substantive results produced by scholars using the dyad ratios 
approach. 
5. Item Analysis and Differential Item Functioning 
In addition to considering the overall fit of the model, we can evaluate the 
individual item questions. This is important for three reasons. Firstly there is the question 
of item selection ± which item questions really contribute to the measurement of the 
underlying construct, and which should be dropped. Secondly, there is the related 
question of interpreting the scale ± what is it really measuring. Finally, there is the 
question of whether the assumptions made by the model are empirically valid. The IRT 
approach provides us with tools to deal with these three problems. 
We could just consider the residual of each question administration or the average 
residual over all administrations of an item. The problem here is deciding how large a 
residual has to be before we reject an item. A solution to this is to ask whether the 
residuals are greater than we would expect if the model were true. We can test this by 
generating a replication data set drawn from the posterior predictive distribution of the 
proportion of left answers for question q in year y, using the model parameters we have 
estimated (see Gelman et al. 2004, 167-174). We can then calculate residuals for the 
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replication data set and ask how often the actual residuals exceed this. Thus the sampled 
test statistic is: 
 (15) 
Ti (y, q) has a value of true if the inequality holds and false otherwise. We can use this to 
test the null hypothesis that the observed residual is less or equal to the residual predicted 
by the model for a given administration. If Ti (y, q) is true for 95% of replications, then 
we can reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level. 
The model assumes that a given item functions in the same way no matter what 
year it is asked. Thus it is assumed that the item parameters Oq and Dq are fixed for each 
item. This is equivalent to the assumption in item response theory that there is not 
differential item functioning. In item response theory it is usually assumed that a given 
test question has the same probability of being answered correctly by any respondent 
with a given ability. It is violated if a question is more difficult for one group than 
another (again conditional on ability). The assumption that group membership does not 
affect the probability of answering correctly is usually tested using either cross tables or 
logistic regression (see Marascuilo and Slaughter 1981; Swaminathan and Rogers 1990). 
In our model we are assuming that that the probability of getting a left-wing answer is the 
same in any year, given the policy mood of that year. We can test this assumption if we 
assume that our estimate of policy mood for each year is unbiased (a very non-trivial 
assumption). We can do this by re-estimating the model allowing the difficulty parameter 
 27 
(OD) to vary for each question administration, but setting all other parameters (PVD to 
values sampled from the posterior distribution derived from the original estimation. We 
can then test the null hypothesis that the difficulty parameter for a given question 
administration (OD) is equal to the single difficulty parameter estimated for the item this 
administration uses (Oq), as estimated in the original model. The null hypothesis is 
rejected if the estimated value of the difficulty of the item lies outside the confidence 
limits of the posterior of the difficulty parameter of the administration. 
However, we need to be careful in interpreting the results of this test. We do not 
know the true value of policy mood for each year, but only have estimates based on item 
responses. If differential item functioning is present, then the estimates of policy mood 
may be biased. If one particular item fails the test for differential item functioning, it may 
be because this item exhibits differential item functioning. However, it may also be the 
case that this item has failed the test due to bias in the estimate of policy mood due to 
differential item functioning in other items. For this reason, the presence of a significant 
number of items that fail the test for differential item functioning only show that 
differential item functioning is present in some items; it does not indicate which items 
violate uniform item functioning. 
A final method that is useful for item analysis is simply graphing the responses 
over time. Consider Figure 5, which graphs the percentage of left-wing (permissive) 
responses to two items on abortion over time, together with the response predicted by the 
IRT model to a typical question. The two questions are very similar ± ABORT2 asks 
respondent whether they think abortion should be illegal if a couple want no more 
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children, while ABORT12 asks respondents if they approve of abortion in this 
circumstance. However ABORT2 fails both the tests outlined above, while ABORT12 is 
flagged by neither of them. By inspecting Figure 5 we can see why this is the case. 
Attitudes towards abortion become more liberal over time. However ABORT12 is only 
asked between 1981 and 1999, a period in which policy mood happened to be moving to 
the left. ABORT2, however was asked until 2004, by which time policy mood had 
starting moving back to the right, resulting in a divergence with attitudes on abortion, 
which continued to move to the left. Inspecting the graphs reveals that the correlation 
between policy mood and ABORT12 is probably an artifact of the years in which 













































































































































Figure 5 ± Policy Mood and Two Items measuring Attitudes towards Abortion 
A full discussion of item selection and scale construction for policy mood in the 
United Kingdom is beyond the scope of this paper. However, based on the tests outlined 
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here, there is reason to believe that the policy mood measure is really measuring attitudes 
towards economic policy rather than a general preference for left-wing policy on both 
social and economic issues. There are some kinds of social issues (such as environmental 
policy) for which all of the items fail the residuals test.
10
 There are others (such as 
abortion and capital punishment) where some items fail the residuals test, but other, very 
similarly worded items do not. As explained above, I suspect that this is an artifact of 
what years the items were asked in. For this reason I have constructed a scale that only 
uses items on economic issues. (I have also excluded economic items that were flagged 
by either test.) This scale has 128 items and is graphed in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 ± Scale Measuring Role of Government in the Economy 
                                                 
10
 A total of 121 out of 362 items failed the residuals test. 80 items failed the DIF test. 
However all but 11 of them also failed the residuals test. 
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The fit of the scale is somewhat better than that of the scale with all items in terms 
of root mean squared residual and by item R
2
. It is notable that the scale follows a very 
similar pattern to the IRT scale with all items graphed in Figure 4. This is consistent with 
the proposition that the all-item scale is really measuring policy mood towards economic 
issues. However, the new scale still exhibits evidence of differential item functioning. Of 
the 128 items, 27 fail the DIF test for at least one administration. 
6. Conclusion 
I present a model for estimating the central tendency and dispersion of public 
opinion over time from aggregate data. This technique is appropriate where we do not 
have individual level data, but only the proportion of respondent answering in a particular 
manner. It is not necessary for the same questions to be asked in every time period, 
providing there is some overlap. There are a considerable number of research questions in 
political behavior, political economy and comparative political institutions where we face 
this problem. 
The main advantage of this technique over existing approaches such as the 
Stimson dyad ratios algorithm and the Voeten and Brewer linear model is that it is based 
on a plausible model of individual behavior. The other models are based on ad hoc 
assumptions about the relationship between aggregate responses and the central tendency 
of public opinion. Furthermore, the response behaviors implied by these models are 
implausible. The dyad ratios model treats left-wing and right-wing response in a 
startlingly asymmetric manner. The linear model assumes that a given change in 
preferences always produces the same shift in the response percentage, even in cases 
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where the respondents are almost certain to give left-wing responses anyway. The model 
presented here, on the other hand, is derived from a well established item response theory 
model of individual choice, which is widely used in psychometrics, political science and 
other fields. For that reason we can be far more confident of what we are actually 
measuring. The item response theory model has the added advantage of being able to 
estimate the dispersion of public opinion as well as its central tendency. 
I provide measures of fit, and compare the performance of the IRT model to other 
approaches using the British public opinion data from Bartle, Dellepiane-Avellaneda and 
Stimson (2011a). The IRT model fits the data somewhat better than the other models 
(dyad ratios, linear, probit). However, all the models produce rather similar results. 
Nevertheless, even if the model fit of the IRT model were identical to the other models, it 
would still be preferable on theoretical grounds, being based on a viable model of 
individual choice. Indeed, the fact that the dyad ratios model produces similar results to 
the more theoretically justified IRT model provides some assurance that the dyad ratios 
model is in fact measuring what it is claimed to be measuring. 
The code for the item response theory model is provided below, and can be run in 
the free software WinBUGS and JAGS. 
Appendix A: Code 
##Constants to be set in data or in code: startyear, endyear, 
##nquest (number of questions), len (number of administrations of questions) 
 
##variables in data: leftp (proportion answering left), year, 
##q (the number of the question asked), n (number of respondents) 
 
##Data statement is for JAGS. Omit next 5 lines if using BUGS 
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data{ 







##loop over the data 
for (i in 1:len){ 




x[i]<-(mu[year[i]] - lambda[q[i]]) / sqrt((alpha[q[i]])^2+(sigma[year[i]])^2) 
} 
 















Appendix B: Results 
 Mean  SD Naive SE Time-series 
SE 
b 2.20E+01 8.39E-01 1.53E-02 2.03E-02 
mu[1947] -1.29E-01 2.77E+00 5.06E-02 5.94E-02 
mu[1948] 1.14E+00 3.84E+00 7.01E-02 1.24E-01 
mu[1949] 8.79E-01 3.38E+00 6.17E-02 1.19E-01 
mu[1950] 1.71E+00 4.01E+00 7.32E-02 1.21E-01 
mu[1951] -2.53E-01 3.83E+00 6.99E-02 1.28E-01 
mu[1952] 5.35E+00 2.03E+00 3.70E-02 4.00E-02 
mu[1953] -2.67E+00 2.36E+00 4.30E-02 4.61E-02 
mu[1954] -1.25E-01 5.79E+00 1.06E-01 1.10E-01 
mu[1955] 3.05E-01 9.86E-01 1.80E-02 1.92E-02 
mu[1956] 1.86E+00 1.98E+00 3.61E-02 3.79E-02 
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mu[1957] -3.91E-01 7.18E-01 1.31E-02 1.52E-02 
mu[1958] -5.93E-01 7.98E-01 1.46E-02 1.63E-02 
mu[1959] 1.10E+00 8.11E-01 1.48E-02 1.57E-02 
mu[1960] 9.32E-01 1.58E+00 2.89E-02 3.11E-02 
mu[1961] -2.63E-01 4.73E-01 8.64E-03 1.61E-02 
mu[1962] -2.40E+00 2.61E+00 4.77E-02 5.30E-02 
mu[1963] 5.75E-01 6.04E-01 1.10E-02 1.26E-02 
mu[1964] 7.94E-03 4.54E-01 8.30E-03 9.69E-03 
mu[1965] 7.16E-02 6.26E-01 1.14E-02 1.28E-02 
mu[1966] 3.40E-01 3.56E-01 6.50E-03 7.60E-03 
mu[1967] -7.33E-02 4.69E-01 8.56E-03 1.08E-02 
mu[1968] -4.42E-01 4.41E-01 8.06E-03 1.12E-02 
mu[1969] 3.63E-01 7.00E-01 1.28E-02 1.31E-02 
mu[1970] -1.16E+00 7.02E-01 1.28E-02 1.36E-02 
mu[1971] 5.14E-01 9.90E-01 1.81E-02 2.12E-02 
mu[1972] -1.27E+00 5.50E-01 1.00E-02 1.12E-02 
mu[1973] -4.70E-01 4.82E-01 8.79E-03 9.78E-03 
mu[1974] -8.98E-01 2.17E-01 3.96E-03 6.88E-03 
mu[1975] -2.03E+00 2.66E-01 4.85E-03 9.48E-03 
mu[1976] -2.08E+00 2.39E-01 4.37E-03 9.65E-03 
mu[1977] -1.72E+00 2.40E-01 4.38E-03 8.54E-03 
mu[1978] -1.41E+00 2.12E-01 3.87E-03 7.83E-03 
mu[1979] -1.44E+00 1.97E-01 3.59E-03 7.17E-03 
mu[1980] -9.19E-01 1.88E-01 3.44E-03 7.87E-03 
mu[1981] -6.51E-01 1.83E-01 3.35E-03 5.96E-03 
mu[1982] -4.34E-01 1.73E-01 3.16E-03 5.48E-03 
mu[1983] -4.68E-01 1.37E-01 2.50E-03 4.65E-03 
mu[1984] -3.50E-01 1.56E-01 2.84E-03 4.85E-03 
mu[1985] 4.11E-02 1.34E-01 2.44E-03 3.98E-03 
mu[1986] -1.14E-02 1.35E-01 2.47E-03 3.90E-03 
mu[1987] 3.29E-01 1.52E-01 2.78E-03 4.74E-03 
mu[1988] 5.02E-01 2.48E-01 4.53E-03 5.35E-03 
mu[1989] 5.90E-01 1.69E-01 3.08E-03 4.87E-03 
mu[1990] 5.25E-01 1.59E-01 2.90E-03 5.15E-03 
mu[1991] 1.44E+00 2.30E-01 4.20E-03 6.39E-03 
mu[1992] 1.15E+00 2.06E-01 3.76E-03 5.68E-03 
mu[1993] 1.57E+00 2.13E-01 3.88E-03 5.37E-03 
mu[1994] 1.64E+00 1.94E-01 3.54E-03 5.42E-03 
mu[1995] 1.68E+00 2.15E-01 3.92E-03 5.56E-03 
mu[1996] 1.70E+00 2.08E-01 3.80E-03 5.92E-03 
mu[1997] 1.68E+00 2.06E-01 3.76E-03 5.77E-03 
mu[1998] 7.82E-01 1.79E-01 3.27E-03 4.72E-03 
mu[1999] 7.42E-01 2.15E-01 3.92E-03 5.80E-03 
mu[2000] 5.51E-01 1.89E-01 3.46E-03 5.47E-03 
mu[2001] 1.17E+00 2.29E-01 4.19E-03 6.80E-03 
mu[2002] 5.04E-01 2.18E-01 3.97E-03 6.40E-03 
mu[2003] 3.56E-01 2.51E-01 4.59E-03 6.16E-03 
mu[2004] 4.27E-02 1.62E-01 2.96E-03 3.92E-03 
mu[2005] 4.92E-01 2.05E-01 3.75E-03 5.44E-03 
deviance 1.92E+04 6.81E+01 1.24E+00 1.28E+00 
sigma[1947] 5.63E+00 2.85E+00 5.20E-02 5.45E-02 
sigma[1948] 5.60E+00 2.86E+00 5.22E-02 5.14E-02 
sigma[1949] 5.88E+00 2.81E+00 5.13E-02 5.25E-02 
sigma[1950] 5.68E+00 2.82E+00 5.14E-02 4.36E-02 
sigma[1951] 5.66E+00 2.84E+00 5.18E-02 5.26E-02 
sigma[1952] 5.40E+00 2.87E+00 5.24E-02 5.07E-02 
sigma[1953] 6.49E+00 2.58E+00 4.71E-02 4.65E-02 
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sigma[1954] 4.94E+00 2.90E+00 5.29E-02 5.80E-02 
sigma[1955] 5.39E+00 2.17E+00 3.96E-02 4.46E-02 
sigma[1956] 5.52E+00 2.88E+00 5.26E-02 5.05E-02 
sigma[1957] 5.34E+00 2.10E+00 3.84E-02 3.93E-02 
sigma[1958] 2.12E+00 1.96E+00 3.58E-02 3.71E-02 
sigma[1959] 3.68E+00 2.41E+00 4.40E-02 4.51E-02 
sigma[1960] 5.54E+00 2.86E+00 5.22E-02 4.84E-02 
sigma[1961] 7.76E-01 5.35E-01 9.77E-03 1.36E-02 
sigma[1962] 5.47E+00 2.88E+00 5.27E-02 5.29E-02 
sigma[1963] 4.22E+00 1.99E+00 3.63E-02 3.63E-02 
sigma[1964] 5.31E+00 1.30E+00 2.38E-02 2.59E-02 
sigma[1965] 2.14E+00 9.04E-01 1.65E-02 2.16E-02 
sigma[1966] 3.71E+00 1.30E+00 2.38E-02 3.14E-02 
sigma[1967] 1.47E+00 7.04E-01 1.29E-02 2.07E-02 
sigma[1968] 1.54E+00 7.44E-01 1.36E-02 2.25E-02 
sigma[1969] 4.22E+00 1.80E+00 3.28E-02 3.35E-02 
sigma[1970] 6.38E+00 1.76E+00 3.22E-02 3.41E-02 
sigma[1971] 4.77E+00 2.62E+00 4.78E-02 4.94E-02 
sigma[1972] 4.64E+00 1.75E+00 3.19E-02 3.30E-02 
sigma[1973] 5.45E+00 1.71E+00 3.12E-02 3.29E-02 
sigma[1974] 1.83E+00 5.82E-01 1.06E-02 1.57E-02 
sigma[1975] 2.24E+00 4.79E-01 8.75E-03 9.89E-03 
sigma[1976] 2.03E+00 3.81E-01 6.95E-03 8.22E-03 
sigma[1977] 1.52E+00 4.30E-01 7.85E-03 1.06E-02 
sigma[1978] 1.22E+00 4.59E-01 8.38E-03 1.27E-02 
sigma[1979] 1.42E+00 4.80E-01 8.77E-03 1.28E-02 
sigma[1980] 7.33E-01 4.12E-01 7.52E-03 1.42E-02 
sigma[1981] 1.56E+00 5.11E-01 9.33E-03 1.56E-02 
sigma[1982] 6.13E-01 4.08E-01 7.45E-03 1.96E-02 
sigma[1983] 1.27E+00 3.64E-01 6.65E-03 1.68E-02 
sigma[1984] 8.08E-01 4.49E-01 8.19E-03 1.73E-02 
sigma[1985] 1.25E+00 3.25E-01 5.93E-03 1.64E-02 
sigma[1986] 1.30E+00 3.34E-01 6.10E-03 1.66E-02 
sigma[1987] 2.09E+00 3.69E-01 6.73E-03 1.70E-02 
sigma[1988] 1.66E+00 3.45E-01 6.30E-03 1.28E-02 
sigma[1989] 2.30E+00 4.21E-01 7.69E-03 1.71E-02 
sigma[1990] 2.17E+00 2.68E-01 4.90E-03 1.27E-02 
sigma[1991] 3.95E+00 3.97E-01 7.25E-03 1.37E-02 
sigma[1992] 2.55E+00 3.29E-01 6.01E-03 1.26E-02 
sigma[1993] 3.74E+00 3.21E-01 5.86E-03 1.19E-02 
sigma[1994] 3.56E+00 3.28E-01 5.99E-03 1.07E-02 
sigma[1995] 3.77E+00 3.26E-01 5.96E-03 1.09E-02 
sigma[1996] 3.43E+00 3.02E-01 5.51E-03 1.19E-02 
sigma[1997] 2.88E+00 3.07E-01 5.61E-03 1.14E-02 
sigma[1998] 1.83E+00 3.29E-01 6.00E-03 1.30E-02 
sigma[1999] 1.91E+00 4.18E-01 7.63E-03 1.39E-02 
sigma[2000] 1.24E+00 4.03E-01 7.36E-03 1.80E-02 
sigma[2001] 2.68E+00 5.11E-01 9.34E-03 1.80E-02 
sigma[2002] 1.54E+00 3.88E-01 7.07E-03 1.90E-02 
sigma[2003] 2.80E+00 7.00E-01 1.28E-02 1.82E-02 
sigma[2004] 1.40E+00 4.72E-01 8.61E-03 1.99E-02 
sigma[2005] 2.94E+00 5.78E-01 1.06E-02 1.89E-02 
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